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OuRs is a legal system in which it is peculiarly difficult to reach agree-
ment on what the Rule of Law is. I refer to the case-law portion of our
law. Where we have a statute, we know at least what its words are, and
we know that its language constitutes an authoritative direction to the
courts, and we recognize that it can have authority as a rule, even when
its language is flatly at variance with anything which courts have said
or done in the circumstance. Our legal techniques and our theories about
them are indeed somewhat muddy as to statutes: cheek by jowl sit the
principles about statutes in derogation and about remedial statutes, and
it is a stout man who on any given issue can use both at once on the
same statutory language.
But in the field of case-law with which our general theory of rules of
law- has been most concerned, even the sureness about what the precise
fThis article and its successors exploring portions of the case-law of Contract are
dedicated to Arthur Linton Corbin, my father in the law. I suspect that the papers do
little more than spell out and test the implications of thirty or so of the paragraphs
which, these twenty-five years, he has been planting like acorns in little-noticed sections
of his work.
*The discussion of case-law in this paper builds on my BAm~M Busn, especially
those second to fifth chapters which anti-realists find it unnecessary to read as they
cite page 3 of that book; and on my PRAJUDIZIEZNECET, and my SALEs. Once a man
starts reading cases to study their ways of going round, rather than their doctrine merely,
the same cases take on new light and new excitement year by year. Things about the
warranty cases which I printed in 1930 with some blithe assurance of printing truth
have proved to require further corrective study. Compare SAms, c. In with On War-
ranty of Quality, wd Society (1936) 36 Ci. L Ryv. 699, (1937) 37 Cmi. L Ray. 341.
One of the major problems is that of achieving balance not only in perception, but in
communicable statement, between various aspects of the matter which current writing
hides under an overly simple attribution to the words of a "rule of law"-almost any
"rule of law"--when in fact only a right good, well-carpentered rule of law will in a
case-law field achieve those things-notably a clean guidance and a moderate predicta-
bility. The further papers will go further into this, in Contract. For a beginning, see
Warranty, supra; Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond (1938) 15 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rav. 159, and the forthcoming companion study on Purchase for Pralue.
tProfessor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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authoritative words are (which give the whole tone to a Continental dis-
cussion of rules) is almost wholly lacking.
To begin with, the verbal form of a rule of case-law is rarely fixed.
The same judge who announces "a rule" as "long-established and clear"
will often enough phrase "it" three different ways in the same opinion.'
In the very fact that this does not startle us lies a key to the degree of
implicit fluidity of case-law rules. Similar troubles about fluidity and
indefiniteness lie in the common practice of throwing make-weight argu-
ments into an opinion after the "controlling" rule has been laid down.2
THE PROTEAN CORRECTNESS OF "THE" RULE BASED ON PRECEDENT
The fact is that there is not to be found in our system any clear and
definite single relation between the cases and the Rule of Case-Law.3 We
have instead a number of relations, any and each of which is authoritative
and correct if the court chooses to use it. The correct doctrinal possi-
bilities of case-law are hydra-headed, in the most settled field. It is the
probabilities which move within a much narrower range, and which give
guidance to counsellor and court. But the probabilities turn not on the
fixity of doctrine, but on the relative predictability of courts' reactions to
new cases. This is known to all of us, in our fingers. We work with the
actual nature of case-law. But our technique of describing our goal and
our work is not abreast of our working skills.
Let me set down a series of relations between the cases and "the" rule
of case-law which judicial practice establishes as correct.
(1) The controlling rule of the precedent is the ground on which the
court chose, explicitly, to rest the decision.
4
1. Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868), is a leading case on a vital point, the
implication of some obligation to give something more than minimum satisfaction of
the description-words, in the case of present sale to arrive of absent goods afloat. The
opinion gives "the rule" arrived at in at least four different versions of widely varying
implication.
2. Compare Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, 98 Neb. 89, 152 N. W. 310, L. R. A.
1915 F. 824 (1915), where, after arriving at the conclusion "No offer," the court techni-
cally destroys the full force of that ruling by a technically defective argument that,
anyhow, there was "No acceptance."
3. There is emotional power in the ideal of there being some one relation. See
Appendix, p. 1270.
4. "It is true that Lord Cottenham might have decided that case without deciding
the point raised in this. But it appears to me equally true that he did not do so, that
he preferred to rest and did rest his judgment as to one of the matters of exception
before him upon a principle which embraces and governs the present case." Thesiger,
in Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216 (1879). This and the corresponding
cites are intended only to remind that the lines of thought concerned can wear tails and
a white tie, and be received. Each line could be heaped up, if there were any point in
heaping.
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(2) The controlling rule is broad enough to include the theory of an
institution laid down expressly in the opinion (as that a director is "a
trustee" ).5
(3) The controlling rule is any rule or principle "necessary" to the
decision, whether or not explicitly laid down.'
(4) The controlling rule extends, whatever the court chose to rest
its decision on, no whit beyond what was "necessary" to the decision.'
(5) The controlling rule is what some later writer has said it is--be
he court or encyclopedia-and whether or not his statement is accurate.
(6) The controlling rule is anything a court has said, though in
flagrant obiter.8
5. Snelling v. Arbuckle, 104 Ga. 362, 30 S. F_ 863 (1893); In re Hawkeye Oil,
19 F. (2d) 151 (D. Del 1927). See Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintcnance (1928)
28 COL L. R. 312, 441.
6. This was Ames' way of working. A good example is Cornell's treatment, in
Merchant v. Woods, 27 Minn. 396, 7 N. NV. 826 (1831), of Palmer v. Bates, 22 Minn.
532 (1876). Cornell finds "decided" by the earlier case d point which the earlier case
was exceedingly careful to distinguish as not being there before the court to be decided.
The "precedent" was welcome. In Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507 (1925), the precedent
was not welcome, and we hear in a dictum from Sutherland that questions hidden in
the record and not thoroughly argued and considered, etc., etc.
7. In Assets Realization Co. v. Clark, 205 N. Y. 105, 98 N. E. 457 (1912), Hiscac:
does as pretty a job along this line as I have seen. It is scrupulously accurate, and fair
to prior authorities as few opinions are fair. But its resulting formulation of The Rule
is new. Contrast Jones v. Just, L R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868), where the purported process
is the same, but the authorities canvassed are-for reason-twisted out of all recogniza-
bility. Data collected in my SA.as 262.
The familiar signal is: "The true rule seems to us to be . . . " A pronouncement
which follows that introduction may or may not square with any prior language; it
never IJas to. More cleanly articulated, because more definitively stamped with conscious
craftsmanship, is likely to be the whittling procedure. For instance, Svran: "A close
examination of the cases, however, does not in our opinion establish such a case." (My
italics). The cases have been studied. They have been studied "closely." Their language,
and language written about them, has been re-studied. "In none of them is the situation
the same as in the case at bar." (My italics). Then come words of policy which are
not merely words: "We can see no justification . . . No intelligible reason has been
suggested . . . " Southern Pacific Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 21 F. (2d) 283
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927). An extreme type of this procedure is the reexamination of the
foundation of the cases about to be thrown out, instead of opening with the formula:
"If the matter were res integra . . . " An excellent instance is Pelletier r. Dupznt,
124 Me. 269, 128 At. 186, 39 A. L R. 972 (1925).
An excellent instance of the setting up of a new rule out of the cases, with conscious
shaping to fit perceived policy, is Shear Co. v. Currie, 295 Fed. 841 (C. C. A. Sth,
1923). Another, is the return to the te.\t of the Statute of Frauds, in a situation which
precedents seemed to have overlaid. Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. . 355
(1923)-with which compare Stone's prior reading of the precedents, in The "Equitable
Mortgage" in New York (1920) 20 CoL L. REv. 519, 522.
8. Compare the treatment in Lagumis v. Gerard, 116 Misc. 471 (1921) of the
remarks and qualifications in Harris v. Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572 (1921),
which fouhd welcome in the Lagumis case and were then whittled away in Crowley
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(7) Nothing can be the controlling rule which has not been phrased
in quotable words.
Now it may be said, and I doubt not that it will be said, that at least
the last three of these propositions are bad law, bad doctrine, and the
mark of incompetence. To this I can answer only that they are part of
the multiple going ways of case-law. If the fifth proposition does not
have meaning, for instance, I cannot understand the indexing of opinions
in which a case is said to have been "explained," nor the frequence of
citation of Cyc. and Ruling Case Law as giving "the rule." If the
seventh does not have meaning, I cannot understand the desperate search
for quotable language for a brief, nor the pronounced feeling among
good lawyers and poor lawyers alike that to set up new language, though
it holds the actual decisions to perfection, is to buck extra danger in most
courts. Where courts work under time pressure, or with limited library
facilities, or both, these last three propositions will be potent parts of
the available alternatives for determining "the Rule" from the cases.
In a word, if one is to see our case-law system as it lives and moves,
one must see that the relation between the rule and the cases may move
all the way from copying any words printed by anybody in a "law" book
to meticulous re-examination of precise facts, issues, and holdings, in
total disregard of any prior language whatsoever. And any degree or
v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925), in which they had come to appear'
unwelcome.
"The remarkable opinion of Kennedy, L. J., illuminating as it does the whole field
of controversy, relieves me from the necessity of saying much upon the subject." Lore-
burn, L. C., in Clemens Horst v. Biddle [1912] A. C. 18. This means to me that
Kennedy's remarks upon background, theory and practice of c.i.f. cases, including much
which could not have been decided in the case before him, has been made semi-authorl-
tative. Consider the sweeping influence of the theory of "the" bill of lading and its
transfer, in Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557 (1879)-all of which was dictum or
obiter, and to all seeming directly contrary to statutes not challenged as unconstitutional.
Or consider the much discussed dictum in Pinnel's case.
"I would rather have a Connecticut dictum than a holding from outside--except
maybe New York or Massachusetts" remarked Judge Gager of the Connecticut Supreme
Court, which at the time was at its best.
If one has to formulate a rule, the new formulation tends to appear to most judges
and most writers as "novel" doctrine: it is, moreover, hard work to check up on; it
takes time. No wonder there is search for apt language-from whatever "legal" source.
9. Finally, and vastly harder to state, is another relation thoroughly ingrained in
the practice of courts, counsel, and curricula: The controlling rule of the precedent turns
not on the precedent's facts, but on its artifacts: on the generalized statement of "the
facts" which is left after the court has finished its "construing". The bearing of this
I shall develop later. The bother of it as a way of working lies in those instances in
which the artifacts, when produced as the basis for decision, already contain the legal
conclusion, so that attention is drawn off from what the prior courts did with the cases
before them.
"Whatever apparent divergence in or contradictory application of this rule may
appear in the decision of individual cases is not due to a failure to recognize this rule
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kind of operation within that lordly range is correct, doctrinally, if doc-
trine be taken to a description of what authoritative courts are doing
with and to cases and rules, and doing with effective authority.10
Now it is not here urged that any one or more of these working rela-
tions between the rules in a case-law field and the prior cases in and
around that field is The Correct Relation." Each, on authority, is a
dogmatically correct relation. I do think certain of them more service-
able than others; but that is not at this point under discussion. It con-
cerns me here to invite any lawyer or judge to canvass in his own mind
whether he has not used and is not now prepared to use ANY ONE of
these ways which may serve his need, in locating or building a rule based
on case-law; and whether he is not aware, as he uses any of them, that
his procedure is proper, and in accordance with the established authori-
tative tradition of our case-law scheme. Patently he cannot use all of
the ways at once on any given precedent as to any given issue; but he
can and will use several or most of them on any body of cases some of
which have language which tends as he wants it, some of which have
language which distresses him. He will "line these up." One piece of
pure dictum will "admirably state the true theory ;" an opinion his way
as universally applicable. The difference in decision was due only to the results obtained
by an effort to apply the recognized rule to the particular case. The case now before
us presents in the decision of the Municipal Court and of the Special Term on appeal
another instance of the directly opposite conclusions at which different courts will arrive
in applying this recognized rule to the interpretation of the same contract, and in each
case the conclusion of the court is supported by a well-considered opinion." Gail v. Gail,
127 App. Div. 892, 112 N. Y. Supp. 596 (4th Dep't 1908) (my italics). This means to
me: the rule depends on what people, and particularly judges, say the rule is, even though
that saying gives no guidance to the holdings, present or future.
10. Well brought out by Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 14 A. B. A. J.
71. The nature of inductive generalization is to be multiple and unlimited, in point of
authority to be claimed. Only a later case which refuses effect to a given line of gener-
alization, or present horse-sense in foreseeing such refusal, can guide among the possi-
bilities. The whittling down process is of course the most clearly rationalized one. See
illustrations in Note 7. It is nowhere more judicially articulate in motivation and method
than in First National Bank of Wapakoneta v. Brotherton, 78 Ohio St. 162, 84 N. E.
794 (1908), an old rule disapproved, but to be accepted as established; then deliberate
and skillful quest for a distinction. But can any case-lawyer doubt that if the old rule
had looked like a good rule, Baily v. Smith could have "firmly established" that "equities"
of any kind persisted in the mortgage? For instance, in Bryant v. Isburgh, 13 Gray 607,
74 Am. Dec. 655 (Mass. 1859), a rule is derived from "the law of this commonwealth,
understood and practiced on for more than forty years," and authority produced at length
by the simple process of manipulating the word "adjudged" in place of, say, "necessarily
decided," and of noting that lines of unnecessary language had "taken no distinction."
See my SALEs 219, et seq.
11. Any art of dealing with moving life by use of authoritative materials conceived
to be relatively static has to develop either supercraftsman or a multi-headed set of
technique. The only road out is recognition of a larger range of fle.xibility in the ma-
terials. See BRAmIBLE BUSH, cc. IV. V. Koran, Constitution and cases are here alihke
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which quotes that dictum will become "the leading case;" two opinions
with less happy language will buttress his present case by their facts and
decision, but will not be quoted from; one case announcing a contrary
rule will be distinguished as not involving the point here at issue; another
whose raw facts were almost identical will be pseudo-distinguished be-
cause the artifacts were different ("That was a case of an agency") ; and
any text that can be used, whatever it rests on, will be thrown in as
showing the rule claimed to be "well-established." 2
In very sooth, there are a number of recognized authoritative rela-
tions which prevail between the rule of law which rests on case-law and
the past decisions on which the rule purports to rest, and on which it
is supposed to rest. And these recognized and authoritative relations are
frequently semi-inconsistent, or wholly inconsistent with one another.
Here lies the heart and juice of the matter: the various established and
authoritative relations between the rule and the cases lead to different
rules. These different rules, loosely formulated, or reformulated more
precisely, or latent and never yet expressed, are in open or covert compe-
tition, and our going doctrine, both formulated and unformulated, about
how to locate or build a rule gives no clear criterion at all about which
rule is The Rule. There is one test, however, which in the long run we
all use to determine the rule of law in a case law field. That test is in
first instance the test of how future cases will coine out.13
If it is moderately clear how future cases will come out, then a state-
ment of that clarity is the Rule of Case-Law, and it is the Rule, irre-
spective of whether it is a nice rule or a wise one or a just one. And
it is also the Rule, irrespective of whether there are pseudo-rules lying
around which purport to be The Rule, but are not. Doubt begins when
it is not clear how future cases will come out; for instance, because
the accepted formula does not effectively guide decision at all, or because
the courts use it some of the time, but avoid its implications some of
the time-situations which I hold to be more typical than non-typical of
such fields of case-law as the law of Contract.
All of this leads to doctrinal difficulties. "Ours is a legal system in
which"---on the case-law side-"it is peculiarly difficult to reach agree-
ment on what The Rule of Law Is."
12. For a classic instance see Miller in Staiger v. Soht, 116 App. Div. 874 (2d
Dep't 1907), commented on in On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 2 (1937) 37 COL.
L. REv. 341, 357. Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868), whittles some authorities,
stretches others, blows new meaning into both announced rule of the case and accidental
dicta, with regard to others. See comment in my SALEs 270.
13. By "covert competition" I mean to include here not only the drive of courts
to get a just result by twisting, but the always latent possibility that counsel in tomorrow's
case may explore one of the latent possibilities and put it across.
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ACCEPTED FORMULA, CONSISTENT PRACTICE, RIGHT RULE,
AND PRINCIPLE
We are dealing with a going scheme of things. We are dealing there-
fore with that rule which is, in so much of our going "system" of law
as consists of case-law. Our scheme of law is that which we happen
to have, not any shaping to our desire. If a rule is, it is that rule which
we want to find and state.
But one of the going conventions of that going scheme is to obscure
the scheme and its going by always talking as if any "rule" rather per-
sistently announced and recited (any "well-settled rule") accurately re-
flects the actual course of decision, and therefore both rests accurately
on the course of decision and gives accurate guidance in predicting future
decision.' 4 A second going convention is to obscure the scheme and its
going by talking most of the time as if there could be in a situation only
one "true" rule.'5 It seems, moreover, to be assumed pretty generally
that if a rule is "well-settled" it is ipso facto the true rule of case-law,
even if we think it impolitic and unjust; but if it is not "well-settled",
then rightness, wisdom, policy enter into determining what the "true"
rule is.
Between the more concrete rule about a situation and explicit inquiry
into policy, wisdom, ethics (which would carry an unconventional flavor
of open judicial law-making) lies the middle-ground of "principle".
"Principle" permits of frank critique, of open change, and of responsi-
ble choice, within the case-law scheme. It is "principle" which can show
even a "well-settled rule" to be "an anomaly" and undesirable, and
deliberately "not to be extended", or even one to be openly whittled
away.'" It is "principle" which can give guidance in case of doubt as
to the "true" rule.'7 And the philosophy of "principle" in our case-law
14. I go with Radin in the essence of his proposition that the Rule is (at least for
our case-law) what a court will say it is. THE LAW AND M. SMITn (1938). But I
should partly reformulate: The Rule of case-law is an accurate statement, if one can
be made, of what the court will do in the situation.
15. Whenever the doing and the saying of our case-law fail to square, each of
these modes of saying obscures the problem. I find our doing and our saying in the
case-law fields I study to be noticeably and importantly at odds, in places where it
matters.
16. The dictum in Pinnel's Case is a classic e.xample, but is misleading in that the
much more frequent phenomenon is to whittle harder, and more efficiently. Consider
the fate of the constructive performance "anomaly" in personal service cases; or the
brusque dismissal of Mansfield's supposed ruling that a writing would do instead of
a consideration; or the Wisconsin court's repudiation on principle of a recent ruling of
its own, in Knight & Bostwick v. Moore, 203 Wis. 540, 234 N. V. 902 (1931).
17. But "principle," where "there is much confusion and even some conflict in the
cases" will lead with equal propriety to preferring a majority rule, or a minority rule,
as in the diverse opinions in National Importing and Trading Co. v. Bear, 324 Ill. 346,
155 N. E. 343 (1927); or a reconciling rule, as with Cardozo's opinion in Imperator
1938] 1249
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is this: It purports to rest on case-law, and so can claim Authority. It
purports to rest on wisdom and ethics, and so can claim to lead to good
policy. 8 It purports to rest on a base both broad and good, and so can
justify departures or extensions in any narrower field. It has a tradi-
tional flavor of being a major premise, and so fits the traditional manner
of case-law speedh about reaching a decision.19 Its inherent purpose is
to guide amid confusion, so that it escapes check-up against any incon-
sistent data of decision: such are "unsound on principle" and can be
disregarded.2" Its actual use almost never involves a formulation sharp
enough to mark boundaries, or even cores of tendency, so that its wisdom
as a formulation is not subject to check-up; it is enough for the most
clear-eyed opinion to say that "We do not think the principle extends
that far."'" Half or more of the time there is no formulation of any
specific principle at all when a decision is announced "on principle." 2 2
Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920), or a rule built upon lines of
wholly novel insight in the narrow field, by borrowing from some broader line of gener-
alization available elsewhere, as in Ungerer v. Louis Maull Cheese & Fish Co., 155 Mo.
App..95, 134 S. W. 56 (1911).
18. Which gives the current phrasing "to rest on the better reasoning and to be
sound on principle and on policy" its quota of juice, even when no mention is made of
either the principle or the policy. My loose judgment is that the principle in question
is more frequently cited or stated when it leads to affirming a rule to which it leads;
but that the policy is if anything more commonly stated when it tells against a rule.
19. But it is not case-law practice to reason closely from any principle as a major
premise. E.g., "The court cannot make contracts for the parties" does not ever, in a
regime of constructive conditions, need to lead to the rule or rule semi-rested on that
"principle." And I think in this looseness of use of anything called "principle," as a
premise, lies one of the more important utilities of the concept. It does free action from
too close check-up.
20. Since the intellectual office of case-law principle is to bring some guidance out
of confusion, principle always has genesis in partial disregard of authority. Ames' formu-
lation of the bona fide purchase for value principle as an utterly general principle, in
(1887) 1 HARv. L. REv. 1 of course forced attack on some authorities as being wrong.
It is more troublesome that this same line of origin, together with the lines of use
of the principle-concept in case-law, tends to keep an alleged principle from periodic
recanvass of authorities to test its title to the title.
It is, I hope, clear that I am talking here about much more frequent and funda-
mental case-law phenomena than that of "competing principles."
21. See Hines v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 231 N. Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898 (1921). Similarly,
even amidst the careful craftsmanship of the opinion in Alleghany College v. National
Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
22. Williston's writings on Sales and Contracts offer instances many of which will
require discussion in the succeeding papers. The gradations run from resting on principle
not even expressed through resting on some principle so broad as to call up only vaguely
an intelligible line of choice (as in the "He who has permitted the fraud" cases) down
to a situation where even an unexpressed principle shows quite clearly the policy founda-
tion which is in the court's mind. The various opinions in Canavan v. City of Mechanics-
ville, 190 A. D. 252, 180 N. Y. Supp. 62 (3d Dep't 1920) and 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E.
882, 13 A. L. R. 1123 (1920) run almost the gamut of implicit and explicit possibility.
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For all of these reasons "principle" is a concept incorporating for our
case-law scheme all the virtues which in our fonder moments we see in
that scheme as co-existing: authority out of past decision, systematic
order, certainty, simplicity, and rightness. Incorporating all of these ideas
at once, being vague, and inherently resisting any attack from decision,
fact, or policy, because it is itself (by virtue of being "principle") in-
herently right, "principle" becomes an ideal vehicle for moving without
discussion, and without full acceptance of responsibility, into preferring
any one of the multiple virtues of the case-law scheme over any other
of those virtues whenever any two (or more) of them happen to be in
conflict.'
This it is important to perceive. But it is more important to keep it
in mind; for in its little way and lesser range the concept of "true rule"
operates much along the same lines as does "principle."
And it goes without saying that broad and untested generalization can be invoked, and
is, without being called "principle." Yet if one compares In re Cohen, 15 F. Supp. 690
(S. D. N. Y. 1936) where "principle" is invoked without precise indication of why and,
this time, to emasculate any result to which any intelligible preferred pMineipk ought
to lead, with State St. Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 345 I1. 160, 177 N. E. 702,
76 A. L. R. 1298 (1931), in which principles aplenty are stated, but are not called such,
though stated very broadly, then I think one cannot help but see the gain in clarity
derived from precision in the statement of motivating policy, and the further gain derived
from stating such policy not as "principle" merely, but on its legal and, where the case
admits, on its policy base. I like neither decision. But the former one leaves me the
whole job to do: to discover why do I not like it; to discover vhat are the very lines
of my divergence; and so on from there. The latter gives lines of divergence clear to
see. This offers courts protection, in making case-law decision. But a serious query i.
whether such protection is not becoming more unnecessary, as information about the
nature of case-law grows. I cannot see .that those courts which become more explicit
lose effect or standing.
23. The text presents a description, not an evaluation, of one major use of the
principle-concept in our case-law. I have certain evaluations. One is found in EssAYs
ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1931) 89. Le., until the inherent necessity of
occasional creation in the judicial job becomes frankly faced on all hands, there will
continue to be time-pressure and circumstance-pressure to use all the accepted techniques,
including that of appeal to vague or vaguest "principle," to get things done as they seem
needed to be done. And if we cannot get the necessity for leeway faced, then obfuscation
is simply what we have to pay for movement.
A second lies here: guides in a situation still doubtful or not adequately explored are
needed, often desperately. And one can often find lines of guidance which look very
good, even when their edges are most uncertain. "Principles", like "standards:' do a
good and needed job in such a situation, whatever their misuse may do in other situations.
A third lies in a modification of the first: if rules tend, as they do tend, to freeze
too hard upon what has been either done or said, and justice is, as it is, one equal part
of the judge's job, and judges and lawyers tend to feel, as many do, that continuity is
a vital feature of the ultimate workability of the very legal system, then devices (like
the "principle" concept) which allow or even further important movement without costing
undue doubt and felt uncertainty are worth considerable cost in unclarity and uncertaint)
not consciously perceived as such. But I think this very different from my first evalua-
tion. For this one might be permanent in incidence.
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TRUE RULES OF CASE LAW
Now in the field of rules built on case-law we find a number of
phenomena which it is well to look at, all at once. Their mutual bearings
may puzzle us a bit, but puzzlement is the first step beyond discomfort
into cure. There-is "conflict", there is "confusion."2 Both terms refer
commonly to division among authorities in regard to stating "true" rules.
Less frequently discussed are two other phenomena. There is often
enough very considerable implicit and silent consistency in actual decision
even when announced rules are at odds.25 There is often also a baffling
implicit inconsistency in actual decision when some rule is regularly
announced as clear and well-settled "but with difficulty in its applica-
tion" 26-- a lamentable exhibit, so far as certainty in law may be the
desire.27 There are accepted rules which do not reflect the cases at all,
24. Both will be dealt with, in their very interesting operation, in Appendices to
this series.
25. A notable exploration is Corbin's study of Contracts for the Bcnefit of Third
Persons (1930) 46 L. Q. REv. 12. Oliphant's Return to Stare Decisis suggested another,
in regard to contracts "in restraint of trade." See note 10, supra, Williston's neatest
jobs in the Sales Act were a discrimination in § 49, which got closer to the cases, because
closer to their underlying and felt policy than either of the announced competing rules,
and discrimination among diverse types of bill of lading and bill of lading situation which
again lined up actual decision better than did either competing theory-and for the same
reason. In both cases he felt he had created "new" doctrine. Is § 90 of the Contracts
Restatement, or § 45, "new" doctrine? The cases say: Both are rather belated explicit
doctrine. Holmes was moved in Martin v. Meles, as early as 1901 [179 Mass. 114, 60
N. E. 397 (1901)] to indicate his appreciation of a powerful case-trend-to which that
decision then contributed its mite.
26. Startling exhibits are the notes on mortgage and conditional sale in 17 A. L. R.
1421, 79 A. L. R. 937. But minor examples are the N. Y. usury decisions on personal-debtor
realty mortgage for the last thirty years; the N. Y. warranty-in-executory-contract sit-
uation, 1876-1910; the N. Y. antecedent-debt-as-value situation in negotiable instruments,
1898-1917. On a wider scale, compare advance "payment" (new, part-new, or pure
preference set-up) in its effects on the defeat of "seller's" creditors, in chattel cases. See
Comment (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 630.
27. May I repeat what I have suggested before [(1931) 44 HAav. L. REv. 1222],
that certainty in law is some of the tine a thing to be desired far beyond the degree to
which we have it, and some of the time to be avoided with even more careful use of the
techniques now available. In terms of the degree of reliance on counsel in advance of
transacting, and in terms of the degree of available balance between counsel, one finds
similarities between real estate law and criminal law (anti-trust, e.g.) and dissimilarities
between commercial law (written contracts) and commercial law (form-pads). And
whereas business enterprisers' law is a law implicit with risk, and their legal advisers
need hardly be as effective prophets as their technical advisers, and a shift in statutory
taxation policy or administrative policy can be almost as catastrophic or helpful as a
shift in market, yet the very introduction of the Due Process idea (which over the
water has meant repeatedly heavy compensation for abrupt change) indicates that Law
has as one job to temper the wind even to the unshorn ram. And it has. But Juris-
prudence needs to get down to analysis, in terms not of Law-in-General, but of what
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but which, if they go on being accepted, may in time come to shape
future cases.28 For believed and received formulae do have effects."
There is, on the other hand, that persistent earthy sense of courts, that
feel for the case in hand, which leads them to evade repeatedly, by re-
formulation, by "construing" facts out of recognizability, by finding or
ignoring procedural slips, when the rule seems to call for an unjust
result.3 Again, the results are sad for certainty: for no man can accur-
ately tell in advance when a court will, when it will not evade an accepted
rule for any given particular case-in-hand; the only possible advance
judgments are gross estimates of likelihood.3' Just as no man can ac-
kind, and of where, and of when, and of how. If, for eample, such counsel-using, semi-
realty, rule-of-property-and-contract situations as installment sale of house-and-lot to
little home-owners come to be subjected to reformatory regulation with some sharpness
in my State, I shall not feel Certainty of Law-at-Large to be unduly impaired.
28. Ehrlich made this point, with reference, if I remember, to the Sachmsnspegcl.
His reference is to an announcement of The Law, if it or its author gets over, making
itself effective, though it was mistaken as written. Our nearest example on the grand
scale is Coke. Cardozo, in the Alleghany Case, catches into true words a refinement:
"The half-truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves as the whole
truth of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken once
for granted, are disregarded or forgotten,' 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927). Each
states a tendency, not a "whole truth." Each tendency is perennial. Each tendency,
in our case-law, has a full-blown counter-tendency at work beside it.
29. In PAGE, CASES AND READINGS ON THE LA w OF Cou.Acrs (1935) 10, the
formula that circulars are not offers was "applied," in disregard of another, less specific,
formula, that correspondence needs reading as a whole. Fifty years before, in Spencer
v. Harding, L. R. 5 C. P. 561 (1870), the formula that an invitation to bid was not an
offer had been "applied" to an invitation to bid for a specific stock of goods, to be
inspected in advance, and for cash. See infra, on rewards, at notes 42-47. There neither
is question, nor should there be exaggeration, of the phenomenon.
30. Examples must come in the following papers. Yet I will cite here the New
York almost unbroken string of sound results on the facts and issues of warranty cases,
despite all difference in personnel and reasoning, after 1804 until 1860. Warranty, supra
note 12. For modem results compare Comments (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 610; 621; 630.
31. Some biologist has remarked on the difficulty about telling where a primrose
would or would not grow, or whether any particular primrose would. That is the
difficulty which has bothered Frank, and bothered Moore. Frank labored to make the
uncertainty clear, as a fact; and to show the why of its existence (on which latter I
disagree with him); and to persuade that it really shouldn't give too much bother.
Moore set to work on finding techniques for eliminating the difficulty. Those who are
anti-either are distressed much more about their findings of fact (about de facto un-
predictability of "Law," or, better for Moore, at least of "Case-Law," or, still better,
for both, of "any particular Case at Law") than they are about their explanations or
lines of remedy. I am distressed about neither, but especially not about the findings of
fact that uncertainty exists in legal result of particular cases, in a case-law field. Know-
ing that much of it there must always be, and thinking that some of it is useful in the
right places, and being sure that where it ought to be reduced, facing it %ill still be the
first condition to its effective reduction, or to intelligent judgment as to whether any
particular place is the place for its reduction, I am tempted to meditate on star pitchers
who do very well at .650, star fielders who do very well at .950 and star batters who do
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curately foretell which of the multiform precedent techniques will be
employed on a given precedent or body of precedents; he will make a
guess-a more or less informed and skillful guess, on that-subject to
the accident of what sort of case the next case may be and of how well
counsel in that case may be balanced or unbalanced in relative skill.32
What is sure, however, is that not even informed guesses can be made
in such matters by lawyers or writers who take a rule as meaningful
merely because it is more or less uniformly formulated and recited. Its
history in the outcome of cases, seen as cases, on the facts, is the mini-
mum essential to a guess about its future effects. 3 Such study of its
accurate history will commonly enough lead to reformulating or utterly
changing the statement of the rule. Wherever a master of our case-law
has gone to work, such has been one major line and one major effect
very well indeed at .350, if their hitting is significant when it occurs. I wonder also
whether 1000 fielding, pitching, and batting could coincide, or would be worth interest
if it did. If "Law" were as Certain as "It" has sometimes been overargued to be, there
would be no room for advocates, in brief or in appellate court. And no room, in function,
for courts which were not slot-machines. The job would be finished, when the facts
were clear. (To my personal taste, also, there would be little interest in any part of
Law.) The question recurs, therefore, on Where, and When. And then, on making
things in law more certain, where they need to be made so; and more just, where that
is the need; and on discussion, on which part of Law is which, and with which need,
and how to go about it.
32. One of the further, and rather more peculiar, peculiarities of our case-law scheme
of things is that while we honor Men by having them sign opinions, and thereby officially
recognize much more than our Continental brethren the part played in Law by Matt,
the Judge, yet our theoretical scheme of doctrine-making by cases comes close to ignor-
ing the part played by another group of men, the Advocates. In an America where
some lawyers are as definitely more skillful than others as some judges are, but where
we recognize by opinion-signing and person-citing the value of knowing what particular
Judge was at work, this is just plain queer. But, having a word for jury-risk, (in a
case in hand) and an implicit understanding for judge-risk, (as we do our counselling)
we may in due course acquire a word for counsel-risk, as to the possible cases affecting
our new judgment on what will happen. Cf. Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond
(1938) 159, 172-175, nn. 23 and 24. Meantime, there is no single fact which speaks as
eloquently to the pressure of fact and general scheme of things toward relatively predict-
able reaction as the persistent failure of the amazingly variegated American Bar, when
serving as paired advocates, to upset too materially the expectations of the same American
Bar, serving as individual counsellors.
33. U. Moore thinks such study not enough. Moore and Sussman, The Lawyer's
Law (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 566. I have only admiration for Moore's efforts to further
scientific predictability in the law. It has not been appreciated that those efforts rest
in important part on the dissatisfaction of a lawyer whose actual predictive judgments
on the more common basis will rival those of any lawyer in America, with that same
lawyer's inability to commnicate to the unskilled the ability in prediction on "lawyers'
materials" which a master has, himself, and has demonstrated. Moore has moved with all
the drive of a powerful mind toward finding some way to make morc predictable where
primroses will grow, and whether any particular one will. And with fascinating by-
products.
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of his work.34 "New doctrine", which is merely a more accurate formu-
lation of implicit old doctrine, then displaces old doctrine because the old
doctrine had been jerry-built, and gives that aid to future prediction and
decision which comes from having clarity in seeing and labelling the
really significant and driving factors in a decision-situation. There is
another kind of "new doctrine"--that of the advocate of reform in sub-
stance, of change in the course of decision. The two kinds are confused
under the single label "new doctrine" or "true rule". They should not
be. They need not be, for scholars-though no advocate would sanely
pass up the chance of persuading his tribunal (in our case law scheme)
that what he urged was already long-established.
With this background, I recur to the proposition that in searching for
the rule of law in any situation covered by our case-law, sanity begins
with recognizing the actual and existent: the course of actual decision,
if there be one to recognize;" the range and manner of available use
34. To be excepted from this statement would be a great creative genius in a great
creative period, such as the Mansfield of Kingston v. Preston, Boone v. E)re, and
Stuart v. Wilkins. Yet even this is an exception only in incidence. Mansfield's brilliance
would flicker out instead of burning, if the flashes did not guide to results on facts,
as if they had been summations of prior recorded judicial wisdom.
Almost anything Corbin has written since he got his vocabulary worked out will
serve as an example. But what concerns me more is that when cases really start to be
peeled, then despite all differences of age and experience and point of view, workers start
coming into measurable distance of one another's results. Such doctrinally conservative
jobs as Hiscock's in Assets Realization Co. v. Clark, supra note 7, or L. Hand's in
Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), or of Kennedy, Value-A Plea
for Uniformity in New York Commercial Law (1933) 8 Sr. Jonz's L Ray. 1, or of
Bacon on the receptacle cases in Sales, or of the student editor in (1938) 23 Cour.
L Q. 310, do not quite square with the results a more impatient person--say a realistic
distruster of accepted words-would bring out of the same material; but they are im-
mediately intelligible and workable, and their attention to the cases and care with them
have tremendously narrowed the field of possible difference even of opinion.
35. It does happen that the "true rule's" flavor of rightness and reform prevents
a court from taking it as true. Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. F_. 890 (1928),
sees the Restatement as "proposing a change," "a complete reversal of our present rule
of interpretation"--"perhaps, more in harmony with modern ideas of contractual rela-
tions.' "But the law remains." Similarly, it is repeatedly said of a writer or note--
whether in opinions or in other writers or notes-that X has proposed such a rule, but
no case has been found supporting it.
We have here, as stated in the text, a clean confusion, with a resultant possible
head-on collision. If the alleged rule contended for looks to a reform of the course of
action of courts, it is indeed suspect as a statement of case-law, and has only such
claim to standing as "reason" and "principle" may procure for it. Often that will b-
enough: more often, it will not. But if the alleged rule contended for is an dncon-
ventional but accurate statemnent of the past course of action of courts, there is wide
warrant in authority for accepting it not as alleged novel doctrine, but as discovered
true doctrine. It is supported not by a case, but by the cases. But there is the counter-
tendency to see as "the" rules only accepted and familiar forms of words.
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of announced doctrine, which is always there to recognize, but which
gives in some fields a recognizably greater leeway, a recognizably lesser
impulse in any particular direction, than in some others.
The ideal rule of law in case-law will be that which
(1) fits rather accurately the actual recorded outcome of a rather
consistent body of cases examined as cases, on facts and result;
and
(2) is announced in those cases as the rule; and
(3) appeals today as leading to a just result; and therefore
(,4) offers real hope of appealing to present day courts; and so of
guiding them with some sureness; and so of affording a coun-
sellor a moderately accurate prediction, and an advocate a solid
basis of case-planning.
There are some such rules of case-law. There are not too many of
them. Their number is much smaller than we are inclined to think. Of
this the proof is simple. Turn to any skilled specialist in a field in which
you are not a specialist, and tell him of the rules which you "know" to
be "well-settled" in his field. In five cases out of ten, and more probably
in eight or nine out of ten, you will end by hearing a more accurate
formulation of a rule more closely approximating the demands of the
first characteristic or the second characteristic or (and more probably)
a shrewd omelette of both which has ceased to be quite either, than
anything available to you. For what is available to you as a non-specialist
is the accepted patter of the field-that semi-emptiness which is currently
regarded as "the rule".
It will be observed that of the four characteristics of the ideal rule
in case-law, set forth above, the fourth is a resultant of the coincident
presence of the first three. It adds nothing, if the first three be present
together. But it is worth stating. For it will further be observed that
wherever the first three are not all present together the problem of the
fourth not only opens, but subdivides: for prediction, not critique of
wisdom, is the base-line job of the counsellor; whereas the judge has
as one of his two base-line jobs to get a wise and just result.3 6 I think it
follows from this that where the first three characteristics mentioned fail
to appear togethei-, the rule of case-law for the counsellor must at times
diverge from the rule of case-law for the judge; but I shall try to show
that this divergence is less than would at first sight appear. a7
36. See Appendix, p. 1270.
37. I disregard here the advocate. He is like a counsellor, so far as he is planning
what any line of proposed doctrine will carry, in weight for the situation in hand, He
is unlike, in that he is about to undertake his own shaping of the persuasion element in
decision. But we can disregard him here, because any moderately accurate statement
of rules for counsellors will be guide enough for the advocate: he needs to see what
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RULES FOR COUNSELLORS AND RULES FOR JUDGES
Briefly, the lines of the argument are these: The first characteristic is
the utterly basic one for both. A rule which states accurately tile out-
come of the cases, seen as cases, incorporates pro tanto such wisdom on
the cases as prior courts have shown, and such similarity of reaction as
courts are likely to continue to show. Insofar, it does some discounting
(for the counsellor) of what later judges are likely to thik wise and
right; and gives some guidance (to the judge) about wherein his more
personal judgments on such matters may be wisely tempered. It further
sets (for the judge) an indication of what have been the lines of actual
use of whatever doctrine was current, indicating both the range of lee-
way which such doctrine allowed and any clear trends within the leeway
which have proved to grow.3" This sets the picture of how far he is
or is not really free to move unimpeded, and shows where the penumbra
of his honest freedom lies to make further use of the given multiple
case-law techniques. If the rules announced in past cases or in the books
are substantially at odds with the decisions, counsellor and judge need
alike to know that: the counsellor because he cannot then trust the rules
announced; the judge because it is his job to ponder whether to follow
the announced rules or the past courts' actions or some modification.
Serious discrepancy between the rule for the counsellor and the rule
for the judge begins when there is no effective consistency to be found
in past decisions, no recognizable course of decision. Then the judge
wants a rule of wisdom, whereas the counsellor's job becomes one of
gambling on what will appeal to whatever court may get the case as wise
-as being the "true" rule. In such a situation there is more likely than
not to be for the counsellor no worthwhile rule at all-and it is as well
to recognize that fact.39 WVhat there is, is a set of competing rules strig-
there is of certainty, and what there is of leeway. Once he has taken his case, policy
becomes of little moment to him, save as a persuasive tool.
38. It is in the range and limits of use of freedom to move that the heart of our
system lies. What keeps a judge sitting "at law" but under a Code, from giving a
conditional judgment which is called for? On the other hand, what makes it unthinkable
that a sturdy dissenter could not force through the publication of his signed dissent?
In such situations, "cannot" and "must" are silly words. We have a given practice,
we have a semi-conscious judgment that departing too far from it would somehow be
wrong, and we have a judgment very conscious indeed that wrongness is not what we
are going to do.
39. This does not mean that I think that without practice there is no law, nor
that I think law must follow custom, even when custom is silly or wrong. It means,
instead, exactly what it says. For the counsellor, a rule is a basis to go on. If there
is no basis to go on, then, for the counsellor, there is to that exact extent no nile in the
legal system at hand. Only uncertainty in outcome of cases is gained by "seeing"
counsellors' rules where they do not exist. Purported "rules" which merely might be
- used and then put over in court, are another matter; they are advocates' tools and
counsellors' possibilities.
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gling to control the judge, with our case-law giving little guidance to
prediction, save as it illumines the nature of our case-law personnel.
To sum up thus far: we are all agreed that case-law rules must be
based to some extent on prior cases, and the more of the cases there are,
the more so; but we have evolved and established a large number of
discrepant relations between a rule and its prior cases, resulting in dis-
crepant techniques in working from the cases to the rule. All of these
techniques and relations are "correct", because they are all part of the
case-law going scheme, which is an authoritative scheme, as most who
attempt to buck it will discover. Like the techniques for finding the rule,
the ideals of the case-law scheme itself are diversified and often incon-
sistent. The concepts of "principle" and of "true rule" seem to incor-
porate various inconsistent ideal attributes at once, so as to enable silent
or unconscious mediation and even choice among them.
In consequence, in any case-law field, both latent and formulated rules
are in constant competition for governance. The ideal case in which
judicial practice-in-fact, i.e., an actual course of decision on cases, squares
with the announced rule "governing" the cases, and also with present
day notions of rightness, is much less frequent than is commonly as-
sumed; for part of the scheme of our case-law is a set of concepts
and techniques which obscure and slur over the discrepancies, and induce
us to think the ideal situation to be present when it is not.
The test of the relative worth of competing rule formulations lies in
first instance in their accurate guidance to prediction of the outcome of
future cases. Since we can only judge in the present, this test is always
in the offing. The first step in approximation of a prediction is study of
the past outcomes of cases, seen as cases. Where this shows relative
uniformity, the chances are strong that such uniformity, wise or unwise,
will continue; and a statement of whatever uniformity there may be is
a statement of The Case-Law Rule, however much at variance it may
prove to be with accepted superstition about what the rule is. If the
accepted and "well-settled" rule varies from the course of actual decision,
i.e., is superstition, then the best the superstition will accomplish in the
near future40 is to unsettle a bit the relatively consistent course of deci-
sion, and continue to obscure the picture. Where no such relative uni-
formity appears, then any rule which purports to be absolute and clear 4"
has value only as a guide to wisdom, or as one factor in attempting to
deal with later prospective non-uniformity and uncertainty. But the
meaning of such a rule as a going part of case-law cannot be understood
40. Over the long haul, such a superstition has its chance of not going under, but
prevailing. See note 28, supra. But more important for the purpose here is the un-
certainty of decision while the hidden battle rages.
41. On the value of rules stated in terms of likelihood and recognizing divergent
likelihoods, see the later papers.
1258 [Vol. 47 : 1243
THE RULE OF LAW IN OUR CASE-LAW
apart from an accompanying presentation of what the course of decision
does not show in the way of results.
In the re-study of case-law results, and their accurate reformulation,
lies now, as it always has, the path of progress in case-law. Such restudy
is of course not enough. The past is not the whole, nor are the decisions
the whole, nor does the existence of a practice, even among judges, of
itself prove the practice good or wise or necessary. But such restudy is
a necessary precondition to case-law progress; and case-law progress,
reduction of case-law superstition, is in these days somewhat needed.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE-LAW OF CONTRACTS
There is no field of law in which it is more needed than in Contracts.
The reason lies, I suspect, in about even division at the door of acci-
dent and of the nature of the case. For the nature of generalizing and
ordering synthesis of particularized and discrepant data is to force the
rubbing out of attention to any discrepant particulars. Rewards, for
instance, which once were simply rewards," become anomalies, 43 and then
become a form of contract, with certain resultant alterations in their
accepted rules. The cases remain moderately stubborn: the statutory
bounty emerges "as an exception" to recapture a portion of good sense;
rewards get divided and allotted in ways very difficult to square with
existing current contract theory."4 But, for the Contract theorist, at
least the major fighting point becomes "established": reward is contract
(unless it is not) and "communication of offer" is required and so
42. Say, in Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Aid. 621 (V. B. 1833).
43. Say, in Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199 (1866): "anomalous"; "an ex-
ception"; "not been seriously questioned"; good "policy" and "morality." Corbin lists
cases [CAsEs oN Co N ,crs (2d ed. 1933) 22 n. 10] where all or tart of the service
had been rendered without knowledge of the offer. Note the phrasing. Note also the
dates: 1862, 1866, 1871, 1872, 1873, 1878; with four American cases since 1896, of
which two in states with prior rulings, and one a case against the United States. The
challenge to the "anomaly" has effect in Tennessee by 1845, in N. Y. by 1868, N. J.
1873, Cal. 1880. But he lists six new states joining the "contract" rule after 1900.
Id., at 23, 25.
44. Choice v. City of Dallas, 210 S. AV. 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), in adopting
the bounty idea, expressly recognizes the almost utter dearth of real authority. The
line of growth has just plain charm; from case-sense to non-case-based legal theory
which begins to prevail over sense, but dissatisfies; thence to a compromise along a line
made respectable by another acceptedly legal concept.
The originally non-case-based legal theory has now acquired its cases, and therefore
stands on a footing which it once lacked. But it has not squared reward cases with
the current doctrine of formation of unilaterals; the splitting of rewards, remains, inter
ala, to bother. The whole matter needs exhaustive reexamination, and will get it
promptly. Meantime the caution and insight revealed in the phrasing of Corbin's notes
deserve their attention.
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is "intent to accept";45 and there is no need to inquire into the meaning
of the results in life or the cases. Well, perhaps there is not. Rewards
are queer enough things so that perhaps any rules about them will do,
and litigated rewards are queerer still, and in some fields rewards are
said to be a racket." Still, inquiry might pay.
What grows upon the observer, as he studies "the whole field" over,
and dips more particularly into any type of transaction, is a strong sus-
picion that curiously many of the currently accepted rules of Contract
are not, and never have been a reflection of, or a guide to, the case-law
of .contractual relations at large. We talk as if they were, and the courts
talk very commonly (but by no means as commonly as we think they
do) as if there were effective general rules of Contract. And many such
there doubtless are. Such need finding and stating. We can use them.
But we cannot, if our aim is certainty in guiding people, or wisdom in
judging cases, afford to use pseudogeneral "rules." Mere general ac-
ceptance of a formula is not a proof of its case-effectiveness. There is
not only the history of the amazing widening of generalization in the
"Contract" field. There is newer trouble. Any one who has wrestled
with "Contract" problems has become aware that special fields show spe-
cial rules whose bumps the pumice and elbow-grease of the theorists
have not yet rubbed out.47 Treatises on Contract treat some of these.
There are many others which they do not treat.
45. I have met no cases establishing either point, except as a necessary consequence
of some more general theory which "showed" contrary cases to be wrong on "principle."
It is interesting that the principle in question was a principle based on that same sup-
posed need of de facto agreement which Adams v. Lindsell had long shown to be
unnecessary to contractual obligation, and which has no wholly intelligible application
to the "pure" unilateral, the very theory of which was developed to get rid of the type
of insistence on agreement still typified in the dissent in Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400, 25 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1173 (1909).
But, patently, theory which shapes case-law may derive from other sources than judicial
language or action; and, patently, if its sources are various and its effects in shaping
are, even in success, not complete, there is a problem for investigation, where certainty
has importance.
46. As to jewelry, see HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY (1935), which both com-
plements and is complemented by the discussion of the "fix" in SUTHERLAND, THE
PROFESSIONAL THIEF (1937).
47. Rewards have been mentioned. Do they figure in the mind as among the
familiar fields where variation exists between general doctrine and cases? If not, they
ought to begin to make the point. Substantial performance is taught commonly, and
thought about, in terms of building construction, and forfeiture. Has this been cleanly
integrated with the degree to which in Sales contracts, there has been sub rosa intro-
duction of substantial performance by widening the meaning of "description" in the
case in hand? Sales, on the mercantile side, needs an explicit substantial performance
rule, and is getting pieces of it, unpredictably. On the other hand, substantial perform-
ance is still considered by very careful Contract thinkers-c.g., Patterson-to apply to
non-"express" conditions, even in building construction. If such be an accepted formula,
it still, as a formula, gives no guidance, so long as courts have their full freedom to dub
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Every close observer has also become aware of deeper cutting diver-
gences-divergences in so-called "application" of rules verbally alike,
leading, according to transaction-type and issue, to diverse outcomes of
cases. If we view these one by one, and only one by one, with our minds
fixed upon some hypothetical and never yet proved unity of Contract
law, then one by one, as we perceive discrepancies, we discard them.
We forget them. We do not count them. We do not gather them. Selec-
tive observation of the cases has become somewhat too lightly our general
way of working, where there exists supposedly satisfactory doctrine.
Peculiarly, I fear, in Contract. Ve accumulate and cumulate onl, those
decisions which work in favor of accepted current general doctrine, or
something close to it. Cases which talk current Contract doctrine: these
are gathered and indexed, heaped up in availability. Cases which do not,
are scattered, unindexed, lost to mind. The resulting picture of how far
current Contract doctrine is the case-law rule, of how far it is a guide
to either prediction of outcome or to wise decision, that resulting picture
is considerably askew. It misleads counsel and client. It even misleads
judges, some times-and unpredictably. This strikes a commercial lawyer
as regrettable. And as unnecessary.
Now such remarks might be waved aside as being merely a ballooning
into pseudo-importance of those trivial discrepancies with which we
are all of course familiar. Or it might be cold-storaged as merely one
more expression of "the realists'" phobia, in their neurotic particularism,
against the general and the logical elements in law, or even in case-law.
"express" or "implied" whatever may seem (alternatively) demanded by precedent or
demanded by justice. The New York warranty cases are in point Warranty, II. But
so, in the construction field, is Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239, 240,
129 N. E. 889, 890 (1921). The clause there read: "all wrought iron pipe must be
well galvanized, lap welded pipe of the grade kno-wn as 'standard pipe' of Reading man-
ufacture." (My italics.) Now I refuse to believe that the insertion of a comma and
an "and" after pipe, could have done much more than turn an advance prediction of
perhaps 4-3 into an equally gambling prediction of perhaps 3-4. Both, in advance,
most doubtful. For at least two of the votes, where one was enough to swing the
court, moved on totally different grounds, the vote in favor of plaintiff conceding
"express"ness of condition, the vote in favor of defendant resting on the adequacy of
an action in quasi-contract. I adduce these non-documented statements at this point
not to explain that holding, but to help foresee or guide happenings still to happen-
for that is where things legal count most. My own guess is that accepted doctrine,
with the ill-chosen term "express condition:' had phrased the real issue rather unfortun-
ately for the juice behind the issue. Which led to uncertainty, for counsellors, as to
outcome; and to uncertainty, for good and careful judges, as to both what ease-law
directed, and as to what was wise.
Other more factually specific situations will be discussed in following articles.
I choose one here which is factually general: no type of rearrangement of a going
deal between contractors has been sharply distinguished in explicit orthodox doctrine,
with any tlarity, from initiation of a prospectic deal. The cases show at least material
differences as to offer and acceptance, consideration, statute of frauds, and legality.
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But even a hurried glance at the history of Contract doctrine must
counsel against such light misdisposition of the matter.
ONE "GREAT" DOCTRINAL PSEUDO-ACHIEVEMENT AS A WARNING
It once seemed a great achievement to "reduce" consideration to the
formula of bargained-for detriment to the promisee. 4' As thus "re-
duced," the principle threatened all claims by beneficiaries, some of which
the courts had been moderately busy enforcing.49 These days, that doe,
not seem to have offered any gain in policy; certainly it was a departure
from cases frequent enough to induce a change in typical life insurance
beneficiary clauses. The principle threatened in addition all enforcement
based on subsequent reliance. That was a departure from a goodly body
of cases; these days it does not seem to have offered too great a gain
in policy.50 It is beginning to be clear, moreover, that the broader prin-
ciple which was so "reduced", rests, itself, on very dubious over-gener-
alization. Promises to make a benefaction are in fact very commonly
enforceable in our case law;"1 and in my own opinion, most of those
48. Langdell did this job rather to any admirer's satisfaction. Holmes gives the
job the accolade: "and only of late years has it been reduced to the universal expression
of detriment to the promisee." COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 218. (Holmes,
though at times in Contract matters materially more interested in system than in
sense, tried repeatedly with shrewd strokes to place the ball where it belonged. See
notes to What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 704).
N. Isaacs' admiration for such achievements of Contract systematization in the 19th
century, expressed in Standardizing of Contracts (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 34, seems to
me to have waned materially as he came to deal with the facts about business agreements
today. Williston, however, still recorded the influence of the great achievement, when
he created for Restatement and Text a category: "Contracts Without Consideration."
(In this lies as fine a compromise between honor to the past and furtherance of case-
law reform as has ever been in our system conceived.)
49. Am I wrong in thinking that cases refusing claims to moderately clear bene-
ficiaries are rarish in pre-1870 America, and that cases enforcing such claims are
frequent enough to suggest both a need and its recognition? Or do I overgeneralize
from what I know happened in New York?
50. As to the departure, I reserve detail for real discussion. Comparative dates
become important. Cases dealing with initiation and with readjustment require special
treatment. The kind of case which was lying around and was departed from is, inter
alia, the kind of case which Shattuck has been turning up in his Gratuitous Promises-
a New Writ? (1937) 35 MIcir. L. REv. 908. Only that the author there has been
misled by the verbal result of this supposed principle into dealing with a very old and
moderately well-sustained body of decision as if it had something New about it.
51. Here lies the heart of a full and documented paper. It rests in part on what
Shattuck, cited supra note 50, perceived as fact, but conceived as queer. The note in
(1938) 23 CoPn. L. Q. 310 perceives a trend, sees it also as queerish, and then, while
facing the cases squarely (as does Shattuck) tries, with a touch of vigor, to find a way
around what seem to be some implications. Compare also Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y.
233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918). See the later papers of this series.
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which are, should be. But note: when the courts enforce a promise to
make a benefaction, they do not say: "This promise ought to be and
hereby is enforced, although in no common or sane meaning is it other
than gratuitous and unexecuted." They say: "Of course, in our law,
gratuitous unexecuted promises are unenforceable;" then they enforce
the one in hand. If this happens along any describable lines of moderate
regularity, then a statement of the lines and degree of that regularity
is a statement of the rule of the case-law6 2 And to put for-ward such
a statement is not to depart from principle. It is merely to make clear
that the so-called principle in question is not a full-fledged honest and
clean principle of case-law, but is instead an over-formulation or mis-
formulation of the principles of case-law. To mask an inadequate formu-
lation under the disguise of Principle may save it for a time from
detection and unmasking, and may mislead students and even courts, and
in the case of small fields where emotions do not stir or interests do
not cumulate may even in time allow the masker to squat his way into
prescriptive rights- but such masking does not make a formulation
into a Principle, nor does the masker's success in being called by that
name: he must get results, on cases, in decisions, and with some regu-
larity, else he remains pseudo. When his acceptance would lead to ob-
jectionable results, even courts which are most polite to him show singular
skill, much of the time, in avoiding acceptance of his orders or advice.3
It is the case law scholar's task to note and cumulate these instances along
with those which, under the influence of accepted doctrine, the digest
makers gather accessibly. We need, in the masquerade of case-law, and
of Contract case-law in particular, to go on spotting the imposters. Is,
it not queer that, for instance, the great "principle" of detriment, etc.
(which does not even effectively cover that huge body of contracts, the
bilaterals) 54 which has proved inadequate as a negative test at every
turn, and inadequate as a positive test again and again5--is it not queer
that this pervading "principle", although unmasked, not only maintains
a good deal of social acceptability himself, but raises so few doubts in
conventional minds about his company?
BUILDING GOOD CASE-LAW PRINCIPLE-OR RULE
Yet most of such or any principles of Contract have bars sinister upon
their hidden scutcheons. The sound and legitimate way of bringing a
52. The If is the point, and one to be proved by cases.
53. Eno, Price Movements and Unstated Objections to the Deectitre Performance
of Sales Contracts (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 782.
54. As Corbin has well noted, CAsEs ON CoNTMCrs (2d ed. 1933).
55. See my What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective (1931) 40 Ymam L J.
704, 741, et seq.
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principle of case-law (which has only very remotely to do with a prin-
ciple of justice)"0 into the world is to canvass all the case material which
the proposed principle would cover. Nothing can wisely be thrown out
as "wrong" until it has been looked over to see why its presence as
decision does not shed doubt on the validity of the proposed formulation
as being a principle at all. Such a line of attack demands of the claimant
"principle" that it bring not only order, but wisdom; that the classifi-
cation on which it rests be a significant classification, and that the criterion
it sets up be a significant criterion, over substantially the whole of the
material classified. In the case of the Statute of Frauds, e.g., the fol-
lowing might promise good results as a clarifier of when cases verbally
under the Statute would be (and where "would" is doubtful, should be)
taken out: "If independent of testimony about oral transactions there
is in the court's opinion objective indication of action by the plaintiff
which is really hard to explain unless the defendant made some kind
of promise, or if the defendant has in the court's opinion received so
much benefit at the plaintiff's expense that he will not outrageously suffer
if the plaintiff puts bver a lie, but the plaintiff will outrageously suffer
if he is telling the truth, then the plaintiff may go to the jury on whether
an oral promise was made, and if so, in what terms." This looks like
working sense; it patently fits many of the cases which spring to mind;
it patently fails to fit others; most of these others one does not like. But
surely such a formulation would not work out on an employment contract
for five years; nor should it, within the policy of the statute. I do not
want to be tedious, but I believe the illustration to make the point that
what may check up very well in one portion of a somewhat variegated
landscape, or even in several portions of it (say suretyship and land)
may fail wholly to either check up or be desirable in another portion of
the landscape included arbitrarily in a map whose borders have been
dictated not by examination of the full data in the particular situation
in hand, but by some general notion merely that such is the landscape
unit-for any purpose where the contrary is not demonstrated. At present
writing Contract carries, to most of us, a presumption of unity of rule,
a presumption also that the rule works out to uniform results, unless the
contrary is demonstrated in the particular case. I hold, despite the language
of courts, writers and Restaters, that no case-law foundation has ever
been laid for such a presumption. I urge that there is a foundation, in
all probability, to be laid for many close-to-universal rules of Contract,
and to be laid out of case-law. But I do not know what those rules may
be. Neither does any other Contracts scholar. Sales, insurance, employ-
56. General jurisprudential discussion might, in our legal system, run comfortably
without touching the case-law of Contract. I propose to challenge any such possible
discussion at both ends: (A) I want to touch the case-law of Contract. (B) I want
to limit my remarks to the case-law of Contract.
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ment, real estate brokerages, construction deals, and what have you,
have been drawn to set up Principles of Contract. Exceptions come
where something somewhere got too uncomfortably in the way. Our
rules and principles of Contract, as we have them, do not rest on clean
inductive work, nor yet on clean analysis of significant factors in a con-
fusion. They represent, instead, a swell idea which never has been ade-
quately tested on the modern cases.
Corbin has probably come closer to the testing than any other case-
law scholar, living or dead. As one watches his writing, one-observes
two exceedingly interesting phenomena. Two phenomena exceedingly
promising, as well. First, he never lets go of the cases. Second, he
never lets go of the need for clarification-for every grain of clarifi-
cation which the cases will allow. His earlier work looks toward clari-
fication of the field, and the setting up of a conceptual frame-work. But
his conceptual frame-work (built on and beyond Hohfeld's) was in the
earlier mature work essentially not one of substance, but one of vocab-
ulary, to enable statement of substance. 7 Meantime, the cases were used
to tear down or challenge current over-statements, whosesoever, and his
classes were taught that to the degree of uncertainty which might exist,
flat and absolute pseudo-rules were unsolid things to rest on. What one
may call the middle period of the mature writing grows increasingly
concrete, and deals with substance. Always, again, with most careful
emphasis upon the cases. With more emphasis than before upon their
more concrete phases. Moving, now, into narrower and more intensive
case-exploration: third party beneficiaries, let us say, in English lazw,
or in construction bonds, or in construction bonds in federal courts, nar-
rowed by jurisdiction, or narrowed by situation-type, or both; but each
narrowing significant, as proved by the results.5 This was a period of
drilling, hole by hole, to test formations in the field, to find out whether
it was uniform, and how far so, and with what theretofore unsuspected
matters to watch for. The end product, remedy, came in then for hard-
headed study, along with operative facts and "construction." The final
product has been synthesis, still with hand, eye and boring drill directed
to the case-results. "The more I read the cases, and the more thoroughly
I meet what is there in the great body of them, the less certain I grow
about theories, including my own, that were based on just a few of
57. I refer here to such articles as his Offer and Acceptance, and Somne of the
Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 169, and his first "Consideration" and
"Third Party Beneficiary" and "Conditions" material Compare Radin, A Restatement
of Hohfeld (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 1141.
58. Stuff whose clean doing, and therefore clean reading, is there to be seen and
has to be used, begins with such papers as Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons
in Connecticut (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 489, and moves on to such as Third Parties as
Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 9.
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them. It is the first chapters of my book, where I thought I had really
ripened my ideas, which are giving me the most trouble now. Unthinking
one's inadequate results, and rethinking the material, is tough work."59
Not for Corbin that anecdote of Vinogradoff, when that fine but tired
scholar is said to have been faced with unchallengeable evidence that
some of his work was wrong. Not for Corbin, any alleged: "Young
man, you are asking me to rethink all I know." Corbin's book will be
the first sustained testing of the general lines of accepted Contract theory
which we have ever had. I anticipate a most sympathetic testing. I also
anticipate considerable embarrassment for both general and particular
lines of orthodox Contract theory.
Dissatisfaction with the current of orthodox theory-summed up in
the sequence of Langdell, Williston, Restatement, Williston and Thomp-
son-has not been absent. The more adequate expressions of dissatis-
faction have appealed to the cases as the test. Before the Restatement,
there had been shrewd inquiries by such as Patterson, McGovney, Bal-
lantine, Costigan,-to say nothing of Corbin. I think it fair to say,
however, that none of these (as of their date of writing) challenged the
essential foundations of the then existing layout. Much more, they
refined and reformulated substantially within a structure given. Pound
came closer to a challenge,"0 but stopped short of case exploration to see
what could really be done as a substitute. When individual writers have
attacked consideration or the statute of frauds, it seems to have been
rather on grounds of policy, with orthodox doctrine presupposed to be
existent and potent.61 Clean breach with the what had aforetime been
59. Some such words, which are my best guess at the words he used, I heard from
him a few years back. Corbin began not from Langdell, but from Parsonst
60. Corbin's work is known. It is labelled Contract. Patterson's, both in article
and the often, and this time, more important field of Case-book, is known. McGovney
has some of his nicest stuff recorded in SEI.ECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.
So has Ballantine, although he has also spread insidiously sound influence over his
book for bar review. Costigan's CASE-BOOK simply stands in beauty-with due defer-
ence to his articles. But it may be suggested that some of Patterson's or Goble's work
is probably labelled not Contract, but "Insurance," and some of Costigan's, is labelled
Trusts, and some of Havighurst's is perhaps not labelled at all with any conventionally
effective device which will draw it into discussion of Contract rules-as Fuller's and
Mason's, and Gardner's, may not be, for varying reasons-and it may be suggested
further that the unlabelled stuff can come as close and closer to the juice than does
the labelled. Radin's Restatement of Hohfeld (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 1141, begins by
making a point: the real point that the behind-the-cases "theory" may have real stuff.
It may. Some of it inust (although in posse). Meanwhile we search, in Case-Law.
Some of our finer searchers are named above.
Pound's "closer to challenge" is found first, so far as my reading goes, in his PIUL-
OSOPHY OF LAW (1925).
61. Enough is cited in BOGERT AND BRIrrON, CASES ON SALES (1936) on the
Statute of Frauds; Consideration has long been a rather indiscriminate object of attack.
Let me cite here Lorenzen's rather moderate Causa and Consideration in the Law of
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regarded as "orthodox" turned up rather in the greater and sillier, per-
haps, reaches of the "bargained for detriment" principle mentioned above,
and in the factually minor case of attempted revocation of offer for a
"unilateral."
But within the last decade a wholly distinct line of worry has been
making itself vocal. It involves a challenge to the very structure of
orthodox Contract doctrine. The precursor was Walter Cook, following
Hohfeld's jurisprudence on the relation of equity to law into a case-
book merger of quasi-contract and equitable remedy.c* This Patterson
followed with a marriage of Cook's Remedy ideas with Contract-theory,
whose results Orthodox Theory has yet to take full account of. The
Restatement of Restitution shows the influence of Keener, Woodward
and Cook, without attempting any indelicate and thorough integration
into Contract theory.64
Meantime Gardner had looked over Contract as a Whole3 (Corbin had
already begun the orthodoxly outrageous marriage of Offer and Ac-
ceptance with Conditions6" which Sharpe"7 and various student editors
have blessed and furthered) ;18 Gardner, if I read him right, was shocked
at the disorder and disharmony and un-thought-throughness which he
found in the doctrines gathered under the label Contract. He attempted
a restatement of Principles in Hierarchy; a beautiful and (for our
modern case-law) a novel idea; both method and substance deserve atten-
tion which they have not received. The method not only of carefully
formulating a principle, but of carefully formulating not a single one
ad hoc, but a number of competing principles, in the light of a whole
picture; and then not of simply posing them in competition, but trying
to arrange machinery for choice among them: this is almost as fine a
contribution to juristic method as is Corbin's relentless and unremitting
search for and of the cases and his insistence on making any theory
square with them. In direct application to tie law of Contract, Gardner's
principles are suggestive, but they need heavy case-law study to develop
whether they are principles of Gardner or of case-law. To be a principle
of case-law, rather than merely for case-law, an alleged principle must
bring its secta, it must number them off, it must measure their number
Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 621, and then refer merely to my ensuing article.
Because this matter, like some others of those previously referred forward, is a bit
delicate to deal with in advance.
62. CoOK, CAsES ox EQunt (1932).
63. 2 PATTERSON, CAsES AND MATERrALs ON CoNTEACTs (1935).
64. See Patterson, Book Review (1938) 47 YAIX L. J. 1420.
65. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contract (1932) 46
HAav. L. REv. 1.
66. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Somne of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917)
26 YATx L. J. 169; one of the most essentially disruptive papers ever published.
67. Sharp, Book Review, (1936) 4 U. oF CH. L. REv. 30.
68. E.g., Comment (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 463.
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and worth against the opposition. It must also show cause for not letting
the opposition secede into a separate category, with a different principle,
and for not admitting some other phrasing of issue as one more vital,
which would more further harmony.
Gardner's line of attack on remaining disorder in the field (which for
all difference in method and expression is akin to Michael and Adler's
work toward logical statement of the law of Evidence)" ° is both like
and unlike the more general current of modern dissatisfaction with Con-
tract rules as currently accepted. Both doubt. Gardner seeks resolution
of doubt by further arrangement and order. The bulk of doubters,
troubled as Gardner has been, have yet found their troubles concentrating
rather on the cases. Into these they have bored. Each boring yields new
evidence that our accepted formulations of the rules of law in the field
of Contract do not express the cases. Each boring, if one puts the borings
together, creates or strengthens an impression that a re-analysis of basic
concepts would materially further the statement of case law, and indeed
that the courts in action have been materially wiser than has been the
dictuming of either the scholars or the opinions. The impression is, in
a word, that large portions of currently accepted Contract doctrine
neither are law, nor ought to be law.
I refer to such work as that of Havighurst, 0 Sharp,7' Fuller and
Purdue,72 Shattuck,73 Mason,74 and Law Review Notes now beginning
to rise in number beyond counting on the fingers. I include work of
my own.
69. THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1931); MICHAEL AND ADLER, TnlE TRIAL OF
AN ISSUE OF FACT (1934).
70. Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic
Relations (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 386; cf. HAVIGHURST, CASES O CONTRACrS (1934).
71. Sharp, supra note 67.
72. The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 52, 373.
73. Shattuck, mpra note 50.
74. A study carrying, to my mind, into closer statement the results gunned for by
Fuller and Purdue, in Mason, A Theory of Contract Sanctions (1938) 38 CoL. L. REV.
775. I hold with Radin, supra note 67, and, shall I say, with Morris Cohen, as the
representative of all logicians (passim in Cohen's implication, and many times in his
expressions) that behind action there are lines of action. From which it follows that
statement, adequate statement for future guidance, of such lines of action, is a case-
lawyer's job. The language used by Fuller and Purdue, or (and to my mind better),
by Mason, is wholly unfamiliar to case lawyers. It may, therefore and of course, fail
to make any dent upon case-lawyers. It may be further cursed, even when otherwise
persuasive, by having attributed to it the notion that it is Civil Law Stuff. But to me
both writers seem to move toward more accurately stating our own Case-Law Results.
And, by test, I am very sure that Mason's remarks have no remotest relation with
anything which Civil Law Theorists have been spending words on. Mason's FaREcu
CASE-LAW talks the French Law in terms of Case-Results, regardless of the words
of the writers. As Ours ought to.
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This paper is intended as an argument-to be followed by successive
demonstrations-that where doctrine does not square with case-results,
that doctrine is not law, in a case-law field. It is intended to pave the
way for a recanvassing of things now known about the case-law of that
field of "Contract" which has to rest on cases; past and future. It is
intended to suggest the utility of gathering the thus far one-by-one in-
sights and explorations into some attempted whole. It is intended as
an introduction to a series of papers the appeal of which will be to the
decisions of the courts on cases, the effort of which will be to present
rules of law instead of formulae of superstition about law, and the
reliance of which will be in major part on the case-study already done
by a rather grand succession of named and anonymous writers who
concur with Arthur Linton Corbin on the point that in a case-law field
the theorists' intellectual constructs have as their first objective to state
accurately and neatly what the courts have been doing. That theorists
are to do criticism only after stating accurately and neatly what it is
that they are criticizing.
As planned, the series includes a study on Offer and Acceptance, one on
Form and Formality, one on Consideration, one on Scope and leaning of
Contract-and jurisprudential appendices. The impulse and analysis of
Langdell, the further development and clarification of Williston, the
-caseless Restatement of the Law of Contract: These seem to me at clear
variance with both the decisions and with sense, on too many points for
-comfort. The five volumes of Williston and Thompson which I have
thus far read contain, to my reading, a desperate, though often skillful,
effort to make non-law look like law. The fault lies, in my belief, in
Langdell's having started with cases of Elizabeth's time, which was a
period of change and worry, but having started with little appreciation
of the movement with which that period was instinct, and equally little
appreciation of the relentless fact that America, 1870 to now, was not
-and could not be England of any date.
But it is not causation which is to be discussed. It is case-law. Case-
law. Over the long haul, every case-lawyer yields to any course of actual
decision. There is no value in postponing recognition of the fact.
In the further papers, which will have to do with specific and relatively
,concrete Contract doctrine, the case-discussion will be thorough. Indeed,
this paper was written after two of the others had been prepared, in
sudden worry that some folk might think an attack on pseudo-rules, of
case-law (because such pseudo-rules did not help counsellor or judge, as
tested by the cases) to be an Attack on Rules, or on Concepts, at large.
In worry, too, lest some folk might think that taking the course of
decision (if there be one) as determinative of the existing rule of case-
law would indicate a lack of interest in good, or wise, or ethical, rules.
Whereas, for instance, so long as judges some of the time treat printed
-forms as if they had been deliberate "writings" deliberately preparee
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as bargained-base, no critique of their action can be intelligent without
some de facto understanding either of how often they do, or else of
when they do and when they do not.
Neither understanding of case-law, nor intelligent criticism of case-
law, is possible, without first knowing what case-law is. In Contracts,
superstition is rimpant. Rampant superstition is unfortunate, because
it has results-sometimes. Whereas, in transaction-law, there is a certain
value in a modicum of knowing in advance where one will be at. The
first job of case-law rules is to give such guidance. In the process of
being accurate, it often happens that they uncover implicit wisdom.
APPENDIX ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CERTAINTY
Goodhart labored mightily to establish a single relation between cases and rules.
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 161. And we have
rather a clearly articulated set of rules for "determining" what is all that a case held
-when we do not like the case; though Morgan's horse-sense breaks through, when he
presents them. THE STUDY OF LAW (1917). Pound sees and responds to the ideal;
he also sees and responds to the horse-sense; then the ideal triumphs, as he turns to
the obscurantist phrasing: "techniques [plural, sic] for developing and applying," etc.
If different techniques are present and approved, and lead to different results, then we
need guidance on which of them will be applied. Frank cut into the matter by exag-
geration from the other end: real and definite certainty our authoritative scheme does
not give us, out of the authoritative techniques above. But as I have' elsewhere insisted,
if some working approximation were not given, somewhere in our scheme of things,
then revolting jurisprudes like Frank and Arnold would not be valued for their 'legal
advice, nor would they dare to undertake the argument of a case. Arnold's suggestion
that leeway in available rules so wide as to seem almost silly provides a nieeded
discretion for the court, has juice. The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the
Legal Process (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rxv. 617. But implicit in that suggestion is a double
additional suggestion: first that something guides the use of that discretion, with
moderate efficacy; and second, that getting such guidance into working words is going
to be one tough job. Both are points on which I think Pound reacts with singular
closeness to Arnold. Pound sees the need of the guidance, feels it ought to be clothed
in working words, and can't quite find those working words. Only on this basis can
I understand his constant insistence that the guidance is actually there, in the rules
we now have; qualified by the very useful concept "standards," and by the less directly
useful one: "techniques." But the "standards" are effective guides less because they are
legal standards than because they are part of the working body of our culture at large;
and the "techniques" work out with a modicum of predictability because American lawyers
are enough alike to afford a business man's gamble on what an unknown judge (and as
Pound well points out, even more predictably a bench of judges) may do. There is vitality
in Levi's observation that it is to the extent that we size up similarities and dissimilarities
somewhat alike that we get a working judgment on outcome of cases. And even the
seemingly devastating and thoughtful analysis of Underhill Moore and his co-workers is
really devoted to showing an important remaining degree of certainty, not to showing
that it does not pay to hire a good lawyer to turn loose with The Lawyer's Law.
Out of all this comes the suggestion that the jurisprudes who have been canvassing
the part played by explicit accepted rules of law in our legal system have managed a
good deal of non-joinder of issue, this past decade, but that all of them have been talking
a deal of sense about whatever portion of the picture they happened to be talking of,
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and that mostly they have talked too broadly. I find enough dissimilarity between the
situation under a statute and that under case-law rules to make it wise to sever the
discussion. I find enough dissimilarity between the situation under a really first-rate
case-law rule and one of the emptier formulae which pass as such to force severance of
discussion. Accepting, with Patterson, as any sane thinker must accept, the fact that
the words of an accepted rule help focus attention and issue, and call up context, and
even lead to deliberate effort to exclude.certain otherwise relevant matters from effect
on judgment, I still cannot see how any one can study, side by side, a situation where
the accepted case-law formulae neatly focus and one where they mis-focus what it is
all about, without perceiving that in the latter case the situation is less predictable, very
materially less predictable. Even when "guided" by badly drawn rules, courts repeatedly,
and with no full measure of predictable result, squirm for Justice's sake--and the where-
withal to squirm handsomely is well provided in the authoritative ways of working.
This is the meaning of Hutcheson's Hunch, and of Fuller's animal in a most discom-
fortable enclosure.
In our contract law, it means that many formulae need redoing.
But above all, for Jurisprudence, it means that we must try to apply the procedure
which we do in reading opinions for their doctrine: read the article with an eye to
the matter under discussion. Above all, I hope we can begin the elimination from our
reading of an alarmist interpretation of dicta. It is regrettable that Arnold, attempting
a point about law and jurisprudence, develops a parallel from theology in such fashion
as to simply outrage a good Churchman like Kennedy. Yet the procedure of hunting
such parallels is sound. Nowhere in the explicit doctrinal literature of our law will one
find as cogent an indication of one vital legal need, that of unearned favor to the weak
and helpless (alongside or above Justice) as one gets from the Church's teachings about
Our Lady. Our Lady's Tumnbler has more to tell, for Jurisprudence, than the history
of moratory legislation, or four treatises on Individualization of Treatment.
Certainly, for this series of papers, I trust that attempted observation of the actual
workings of our legal institutions may not be obscured by any departure from more con-
ventional ways of talking about them. If eminent writers assure us that a case can only
hold, let us say, either its announced ratio decidendi or a rule covering more narrowly
its precise holding, I should be slow indeed to doubt their views as being part of our
case-legal system. Certainly not, if I found, as I do find, courts acting on those lines.
But if, despite such assurances and such action, I also find courts acting very differently,
I am forced to conclude that the expression of a narrow view of precedent is only partial;
and also that the going doctrines of precedent, alone, give no dear guidance. Institutions,
including legal institutions are what they are, and what is said or believed about them is
only one part of what they are. And it would be unfortunate for the idea to gain cur-
rency that would-be realistic students had an obsession for the ugly because they find the
conventional rationale of an institution to be a partial one, which gives inadequate guidance.
Such an idea attributes ethical and esthetic values to heretofore conventional rationale
which in case-law, at least, are seriously open to question. There is much to be said for
the proposition that the going institution has been a deal wiser than have its partial
rationalizers; and, I think, a deal more esthetically satisfactory. Compare Br.A=r Busit,
128 et seq. In the work of the judges, seen whole, lies case-law; there lie, too, the
case-law rules of Contract. When one of those known as realistic students of law heaves
a snowball at a top hat, he shows impatience and perhaps bad manners, but the inference
is not-even if he hits and spoils the hat-that he is undermining the institution of hats
or of clothes at large. If the top hat has purported to be a full description of the head,
there is even something to be said for using snowballs on it, as furthering understanding
of and appreciation of the head. I think we have too many top hats of rather useless kind
worn in the case-law of Contract. But I shall try to ask, in gentlemanly manner for their
removal and examination.
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